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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In the lower court, Plaintiffs/Respondents, Don W.
Ingram and Dick L. Ingram as Trustees and as Successor Trustees

I

of the J. Clarence Ingram and Kate W. Ingrairi Trust (hereinafter
"Ingrains"

or

"Respondents"),

brought

suit

against

Defendants/Appellants, O.B. Sheep Company, Snell Olsen, Scott
H. Olsen and Kirk Olsen (hereinafter "Olsens" or "Appellants"),
to foreclose on real property (the "Real Property"), which had
previously been sold to Olsens under a Trust Deed Note and
Trust Deed, after Olsens defaulted on their obligations under
the Trust Deed Note. (R. 1-17).

On March 11, 1988, the lower

court entered a money judgment in favor of the Ingrams and
ordered that the Real Property be sold at public sale to
satisfy the money judgment.

(R. 646-651).

The Real Property

was sold at Sheriff's sale in August of 1988 and a Deficiency
Judgment was entered on January 27, 1989. (R. 771-774).

An

Amended Deficiency Judgment was entered on February 10, 1989.
(R. 778-782).
Olsens

are

appealing

the

entry

of

the

Amended

Deficiency Judgment as it relates to the sale of the Utah
1

County property.
March 2, 1989.

Olsens timely filed a Notice of Appeal on
(R. 791).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the lower court correctly ruled that the sale
of the Utah County property was conducted properly and in a
lawful manner and that Appellants waived any right they had to
have the Utah County property sold as separate parcels.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
A copy of Rule 69, Utah R. Civ. P., is reproduced in
the Addendum at Tab -1.•'
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents accept Appellants' Statement of the Case
as

to

the

Nature

of

the

Case

and

as

to

the

Course

of

Proceedings Below. (Pages 2-3 of Appellants' Brief, paragraphs
A. and B . ) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about May 1, 1982, Olsens purchased from the
Ingrams two parcels of property, one located in Wasatch County
and one located in Utah County.

The Olsens executed a Trust

Deed Note for the balance of the purchase price and secured the
payment of the Trust Deed Note with a Trust Deed.

(R. 1-17).

Olsens defaulted on the payments due to the Ingrams under the
Trust Deed Note and the Ingrams subsequently filed this action
2

to foreclose the Trust Deed and Note as a mortgage.

(R. 1-17).

On March 11, 1988, the lower court entered a money judgment in
favor of the Ingrams and ordered that the real property located
in both Utah and Wasatch County be sold at public sale by the
Sheriffs of the respective counties in order to satisfy the
money judgment owed to the Ingrams.

(R. 646-651).

The Utah County property was sold on August 3, 1988 by
Utah

County

Deputy

Sheriff Arthur

"Deputy Sheriff Adcock").
Snell Olsen (hereinafter

L. Adcock

(R. 682-686).

(hereinafter

Defendant/Appellant

"Snell Olsen"), who is personally

known to Deputy Sheriff Adcock, was present at the Sheriff's
sale of the Utah County property.

(R. 757-760).

The standard

operating procedure for the Utah County Sheriff's office with
regard

to

Sheriff's

sales

involving

real

property

which

consists of multiple descriptions is to ask the parties in
attendance at the sale if any of the parties desire to have
each parcel sold separately.

Unless a party in attendance at

the sale specifically requests that the property be sold in
separate parcels, the standard procedure is to sell the real
property involved as a single piece.

(R. 758 at paragraph 5 ) .

In conducting the Sheriff's sale of the Utah County property,
Deputy Sheriff Adcock followed the Utah County Sheriff's office
standard

operating

procedure

in
3

selling

the

Utah

County

property.

(R. 758 at paragraph 6 ) .

None of the parties in

attendance at the Utah County Sheriff's sale held on August 3,
1988/

including

Snell

Olsen, requested

that

the

property

involved be sold as separate parcels, nor did any party present
at the sale object to the fact that the real property involved
was sold as a single unit.
Snell

Olsen,

in

(R. 758-759 at paragraph 7 ) .
contesting

Ingrams'

Motion

for

Deficiency Judgment and the sale of the Utah County property,
filed an affidavit wherein Snell Olsen claims that he did not
hear the statements made by Deputy Sheriff Adcock, and further
claims that he did not understand that he had a right to have
the property sold in separate parcels nor that he had waived
that right.

(R. 747 at paragraphs 4-5.)

Snell Olsen also

stated in his Affidavit that there was at least one potential
purchaser who had attended the sale and who had expressed to
Snell Olsen an interest in a particular portion of the Utah
County property.

(R. 747 at paragraph

8).

The

Ingrams

purchased the Utah County property at the Sheriff's sale being
the only bidders on the property.

(R. 682-684).

The Wasatch County property was sold the next day on
August 4, 1988, by Edwin Thacker, Sheriff of Wasatch County.
At that sale, the Ingrams again purchased the property and were
the only bidders at the sale.

(R. 696, 705-707).
4

A deficiency on the judgment remained after the sale
of the Utah and Wasatch County properties.

The Ingrams filed

a Motion for Entry of a Deficiency Judgment (R. 697-701), and
Appellants filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion of
Entry of Deficiency Judgment on the general grounds that the
requirements
satisfied.

of

Rule

69, Utah R.

(R. 708-710).

Civ. P.,

had

not been

Appellants also requested that the

court schedule oral arguments on Ingrams' Motion of Entry of
Deficiency

Judgment.

(R. 711-712).

Ingrams

filed their

response to Appellants' Memorandum in Opposition timely.
715-732).

(R.

Two days before the date set for oral arguments on

the Ingrams' Motion for Deficiency Judgment, Appellants filed
a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Entry
of Deficiency Judgment which raised for the first time the
issue of the Utah County property not being sold as separate
parcels.

(R. 741-743).

At the hearing on Ingrams' Motion for

Entry of Deficiency Judgment, the court, after hearing the
arguments of counsel, gave each side additional time to file
supplemental memoranda on the issue of whether the Utah County
property could be sold as a single parcel or had to be sold as
separate parcels.

(R. 744-745).

The record does not indicate

that any of the parties requested that an evidentiary hearing
be held on the matter, even though the court inquired of
5

counsel

for

the

parties

if

either

of

them

desired

an

evidentiary hearing.
Appellants filed their Motion to Vacate the Sale of
the Utah County property on January 17, 1989, some five months
after the holding of the sale and some four and a half months
after the Ingrams filed their Motion for Entry of Deficiency
Judgment.

(R. 765-766).

The lower court, after considering the arguments of
counsel, and the numerous memoranda and affidavits filed by the
parties, made the following findings:
1.

That the sale of the subject property was

called by Deputy Sheriff Arthur L. Adcock on
the third day of August 1988, and that he then
conducted the sale of the real estate described
in the order of sale.
2.

That Snell Olsen was personally known to

said Deputy Sheriff and was present at the
Sheriff's sale held on the aforesaid date.
3. That the sale was conducted in the standard
procedure for the Utah County Sheriff's office
with regard to sales involving multiple parcels
of

real

property

and

that

the parties

in

attendance at the sale were asked if any of

the parties desired to have the property sold
in separate parcels, and that no such request
was made by anyone, including Snell Olsen, and
that therefore the property was sold as one
unit.

(R. 769-770).

Pursuant to its findings, the lower court concluded
that at the Sheriff's sale on August 3, 1988, Appellants failed
to make a request that the Utah County property be sold as
separate parcels and, therefore, Appellants waived any such
right they would have had at that time to have the property
sold as separate parcels, and that the sale as conducted by
Deputy Sheriff Adcock was done in a lawful and proper manner.
Accordingly, the lower court correctly ordered that Olsen's
Motion for Entry of Deficiency Judgment be granted and that
the Appellants' objections thereto be disallowed.

(R. 769-

770).
Appellants' appeal was timely filed with this court on
March 2, 1989.

(R. 791).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

On appeal, the findings of the lower court can only be
reversed if the evidence clearly preponderates against the
lower

court's

preponderance

findings.
against

the

The
lower
7

burden

to

court's

show

a

findings

clear
is on

Appellants and this Court must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the court below.

Appellants have failed to

meet this burden and the record does not support such a burden.
By acquiescing to the manner in which the sale of the property
was performed, Appellants waived any right they might have had
to enforce a sale of the property in individual parcels.

At

the very least, Appellants are estopped from contesting the
validity of the sale.

Where an irregularity is alleged in a

judicial sale, the sale will not be set aside in the absence
of a showing of prejudice. Appellants have not been prejudiced
on the sale of the property as one unified parcel.

Real

property does not need to be sold in separate pieces under Rule
69, Utah R. Civ. P., unless the property consists of several
known lots or parcels.

The property sold consisted of one

unified piece of property and was properly sold as such.

The

ruling of the lower court should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE APPELLANTS
WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO HAVE THE PROPERTY
SOLD AS SEPARATE PARCELS CAN BE REVERSED
ONLY IF THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES
AGAINST THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT
To mount a successful attack on the lower court's
findings of fact, Appellants must marshal all the evidence in

£

support of the lower court's findings and then demonstrate that
even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below,
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings.

K.J.

Scharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
In K.J. Scharf, the lower court entered a deficiency judgment
in favor of a lessor and the guarantor appealed.
held

that the guarantor

failed

This Court

to sustain his burden of

attacking the lower court's findings of fact.

This principle

is well stated in this Court's opinion in Jensen v. Brown, 639
P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981)(citing Nokes v. Continental Mining
& Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d at 178-179, 308 P.2d 954):
[T]he finding of the trial court will not be
disturbed if the evidence preponderates in
favor of the finding; nor, if the evidence
thereon is evenly balanced or it is doubtful
where the preponderance lies; nor, even if its
weight is slightly against the finding of the
trial court, but it will be overturned and
another finding made only if the evidence
clearly preponderates against his findings.
Appellants have not begun to carry this heavy burden
on

appeal.

The

facts before

conflicting affidavits.

the

lower court

came

from

Deputy Sheriff Adcock stated in his

affidavit that he followed standard procedure and asked those
assembled at the sale if anyone wanted to have the Utah County
property

sold

in

separate

parcels

and

no

Appellant Snell Olsen, made such a request.
9

one,

including

Appellant Snell

Olsen stated in his affidavit that he does not remember whether
or not Deputy Sheriff Adcock made such a statement and then
states that, even if the Deputy Sheriff

did make such a

statement, he was too nervous to comprehend what was going on.
Appellants don't even try to meet their burden.

Appellants

just state over and over again that the low€*r court made its
decision "without an evidentiary hearing" as if it were the
lower court's obligation to sue sponte hold an evidentiary
hearing on the matter when not one of the parties made such a
request.
A careful review of the record does not support a
decision by this Court that the evidence clearly preponderates
against the lower court's findings.

Therefore, the lower

court's finding that the sale of the Utah County property was
lawfully and properly held and that Appellants waived whatever
rights they had to have the property sold in separate parcels
should be affirmed.

14

POINT II
APPELLANTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE
INDIVIDUAL SALE OF THE PARCELS COMPRISING THE PROPERTY
Rule 69(c)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides,
in part, that " . . .

when the sale is of real property,

consisting of several known lots or parcels, they must be sold
separately . . . . "

The purpose behind such a rule is to

ensure that a sale will realize the best price possible.
However, statutory provisions for a division of property have
been held to be merely directory, and the decision to sell the
property en masse is a matter within the discretion of the
officer conducting the sale, 33 C.J.S. Executions § 210a, and
in some circumstances a sale en masse may be necessary, proper,
or more expedient in order to protect the interests of all
parties.

33 C.J.S. Executions § 210b.

As the rule requiring a sale in parcels is intended
for the benefit of the execution defendant, compliance with it
may be waived by him, and such waiver may be implied from the
defendant's acquiescence in the sale or from his delay in
objecting thereto. American Falls Canal Securities Company v.
American Savings and Loan Association. 109 Utah Adv. Rep. 21
(Filed May 30, 1989); 33 C.J.S. Executions § 210c; see also
Bawden and Associates v. Smith, 646 P.2d 711, 714 (Utah 1982).
11

This Court has adopted the general rule that an execution
defendant can waive his right to have property sold in separate
parcels.
The customary procedure of the Utah County Sheriff's
office is to begin each sale of real property by asking whether
there are objections to the sale of the property en masse•
there

are

objections

individually.

of

any

kind,

the

parcels

are

If

sold

(R. 758 at paragraph 5 ) . At the beginning of

the Utah County Sheriff's sale of the Utah County property,
Deputy Sheriff Adcock followed the County's customary procedure
and asked whether any of the parties in attendance at the sale
desired

to

have

the

property

sold

in

separate

lots.

Appellants, who were present at the sale, remained silent, as
did everyone else in attendance.

When Deputy Sheriff Adcock

received no answer, he proceeded to sell the property en masse.
(R. 758 at paragraphs 6 and 7.)
Appellants had ample opportunity to protest the sale
of the parcel en masse at the actual sale, yet they remained
silent.

The excuse given by Appellants for not speaking up is

that Snell Olsen claims he was nervous, had never before
attended a Sheriff's sale, and was unaware of the rule allowing
the property to be sold as individual parcels.
paragraphs 3 and 5 ) .

(R. 746 at

Counsel for Appellants obviously knew
12

about the contents of Rule 69, but did not bother to inform his
clients of their rights prior to the sale nor did Appellants'
counsel attend the Sheriff's sale with his clients (who had
never been to such a sale before).
behind a wall of ignorance.

Appellants cannot now hide

By acquiescing to the manner in

which the sale was performed, Appellants waived any right they
might have had to enforce a sale of the individual parcels
(assuming,

arguendo,

that

the

real

property

involved

is

actually deemed to be separate parcels).
At the very least, Appellants should be estopped from
contesting the validity of the Sheriff's sale.

In Hunter v.

Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), this Court set forth the
distinction between the doctrines of estoppel and waiver.
Waiver is the voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known
right.

Estoppel is a doctrine which precludes parties from

asserting their rights where their actions or conduct render
it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights.

Id., 669

P.2d at 432. The Sheriff's sale of the Utah County property was
conducted on August 3, 1988, with Snell Olsen in attendance.
Appellants did not bother to object to the sale of the property
en masse or even raise the issue until October 25, 1988, and
then only in a Supplemental Memorandum filed in opposition to
Ingrams' Motion for Entry of Deficiency Judgment.

11

Appellants

waived their right to have the property sold in separate
parcels and at the very least their delay in raising the
objection in a timely manner estops Appellants from raising the
objection.
POINT III
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT
THE EN MASSE SALE OF THE PROPERTY
RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THEM
"The policy of the courts is to uphold judicial sales
except when they are manifestly unfair . . . Especially is this
true in a state such as Utah which has a substantial period of
redemption."
(1959).

Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52, 337 P.2d 429

It is hoped that such a policy will encourage bidding

at judicial sales and because it appears to be a waste of time
to require a new sale where little evidences is presented to
show that the bid price at the new sale will be any different
from the bid at the old.
execution

sale need

Id.

not be

The general rule is that an
set aside merely because

the

property is sold en masse instead of in parcels. Whether the
alleged irregularity is sufficient to justify vacating the sale
has been regarded as a matter resting in the sound discretion
of the court and will not be set aside in the absence of a
showing of prejudice.

Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52, 337 P.2d

429 (1959); Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, 236 P.2d 343

14

(Utah 1951); 30 Am. Jur. 2d

Execution § 732; 33 C.J.S.

Executions § 210d.
Appellants have made no showing that the sale of the
real property by the Utah County Sheriff prejudiced them in
any way.

The only possibility for prejudice which Appellants

present is the testimony of Snell Olsen that a third party at
the sale mentioned to him that the third party might want to
buy one certain section of the property,

(R. 747 at paragraph

8), but there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate
that the result of the sale would be any different if the sale
were held again.

The only benefit Appellants would receive

from a resale of the Utah County property would be to further
delay the conclusion of this action. The statutory redemption
period has run and Respondents have received the Sheriff's deed
conveying title to the Utah County property to them and setting
aside the sale will result in great harm to the Olsens who are
in the process of trying to resale the Utah County property.
Appellants have not shown or even argued that they were
prejudiced by the sale of the Utah County property in one
piece, and assuming, arguendo, that Appellants could show
prejudice, such prejudice is harmless and resulted from their
own lack of action and should not be allowed to be used to set

15.

aside the sale of the Utah County property at this point in
time.
POINT IV
THE UTAH COUNTY PROPERTY HAS NEVER BEEN TREATED
OR KNOWN AS SEPARATE PARCELS
The clear and unequivocable language of Rule 69(e)(3)
states that real property does not need to be sold in separate
pieces unless the real property consists "of several known lots
or parcels,"

In Commercial Bank of Utah v. Marsden, 236 P.2d

343 (Utah 1951), the plaintiff judicially foreclosed on a
mortgage and then sought to vacate the sheriff's sale on
several grounds, including the objection that, under Rule
69(e)(3)/ the property should have been sold as two separate
parcels. This Court specifically stated that, "[T]he fact that
the land is described as 'Lots 1 and 2 of Block 28, Plat A,
Manti City Survey' does not serve to make separate tracts of
an otherwise unified parcel." Marsden, 236 P.2d at 345. This
Court went on to state that the plaintiff had prepared and
accepted a mortgage on the real property as one parcel, and
that in its pleadings, judgment, notice of sale and throughout
the entire proceeding, the property has been treated by
plaintiff as one parcel of property.

ii

In

the

case

at

bar,

all

of

the

parties

have

consistently treated the Utah County property as a single
parcel, e.Q,:

the purchase price was not broken down by

individual parcels, the property was secured by one Trust Deed
and one Trust Deed Note, and through this entire proceeding,
until this appeal, the parties have treated the Utah County
property as a unified parcel.

The court in Marsden also

referred directly to 33 C.J.S. Executions, § 210, P. 449, which
states:
It has been held that it is the title of the debtor
himself, as fixed by his deed, which determines
whether the property shall be considered as one
lot or several for the purpose of an execution
sale, but it cannot be said that because a deed
describes the property conveyed as certain numbered
lots that such lots do or do not constitute
separate parcels. An owner may convert two or more
lots into one known parcel by his use of the land,
and a parcel may be single although divided by a
street.
Where the property to be sold is subject to a mortgage,
the proper course is to sell en masse, unless the mortgagor has
conveyed his equity in the different parcels to different
grantees.

33 C.J.S. Executions, § 210b.

The Utah County property does not consist of several
known lots or parcels, but consists of and has been treated by
all

of

the

parties

as

one

unified

piece

of

property.

Therefore, the Utah County property was properly sold as one
17

parcel of land and the lower court properly found that the
Sheriff's sale was lawfully and properly conducted.
CONCLUSION
Appellants have failed to meet their burden of proving
that the evidence before the lower court clearly preponderates
against the lower court's findings. Further, Appellants waived
their right to have the property sold in separate lots and have
failed to show that they have been prejudiced in any way by the
sale of the property en masse.

Finally, the property at issue

has been consistently treated by the parties as a single
unified parcel and was properly sold as such.
Therefore, Respondents respectfully request that this
Court affirm the ruling of the lower court and uphold the sale
of the Utah County property and the entry of a Deficiency
Judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 1989.

S. Hart
ieys for Respondents

is

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four

(4) true and correct

copies of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF was mailed by United
States mail, postage prepaid, on this 4th day of August, 1989,
addressed as follows:
Jackson Howard, Esq.
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq.
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo^ Utah 84606
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Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto.
(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to enforce a judgment shall be
by a writ of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which may issue at
any time within eight years after the entry of judgment, (except an execution
may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62) either in the county in which such judgment was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript thereof has been
filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Notwithstanding the death of a party after judgment execution thereon may be issued, or
such judgment may be enforced, as follows:
(1) In case of the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of
his executor or administrator, or successor in interest.
(2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for
the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien
thereon.
(b) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execution must be issued in the name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of
the court and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to the sheriff of any
county in the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties)
but where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it
must be issued to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part
thereof is situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal
property, it may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the
judgment, stating the court, the county where the same is entered or docketed,
the names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for money, the amount
thereof, and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the
sheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real
property, and shall require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms
of the writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment
debtor generally it may direct the constable to satisfy the judgment, with
interest, out of the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient personal
property cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with
interest, out of his real property.
If the judgment requires the sale of property, the writ of execution shall
recite such judgment, or the material parts thereof, and direct the officer to
execute the judgment by making the sale and applying the proceeds in conformity therewith. The judgment creditor may require a certified copy of the
judgment to be served with the execution upon the party against whom the
judgment was rendered, or upon the person or officer required thereby or by
law to obey the same, and obedience thereto may be enforced by the court.
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(c) When writ to be returned. The writ of execution shall be made returnable at any time within two months after its receipt by the officer. It shall be
returned to the court from which it issued, and when it is returned the clerk
must attach it to the record.
(d) Service of the writ. Unless the execution otherwise directs, the officer
must execute the writ against the property of the judgment debtor by levying
on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient [property]; collecting
or selling the choses in action and selling the other property, and paying to
the judgment creditor or his attorney so much of the proceeds as will satisfy
the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and accruing
costs must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directed by
the judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judgment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs
within view of the officer, he must levy only on such part of the property as
the judgment debtor may indicate, if the property indicated is amply sufficient
to satisfy the judgment and costs.
When an officer has begun to serve an execution issued out of any court on
or before the return day of such execution he may complete the service and
return thereof after such return day. If he shall have begun to serve an execution, and shall die or be incapable of completing the service and return
thereof, the same may be completed by any other officer who might by law
execute the same if delivered to him; and if the first officer shall not have
made a certificate of his doings, the second officer shall certify whatever he
shall find to have been done by the first, and shall add thereto a certificate of
his own doings in completing the service.
(e) Proceedings on sale of property.
(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property on execution notice thereof
must be given as follows: (1) in case of perishable property, by posting
written notice of the time and place of sale in three public places of the
precinct or city where the sale is to take place, for such a time as may be
reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property; (2) in
case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in at least
three public places of the precinct or city where the sale is to take place,
for not less than 7 nor more than 14 days; (3) in case of real property, by
posting a similar notice, particularly describing the property, for 21 days,
on the property to be sold, at the place of sale, and also in at least 3 public
places of the precinct or city where the property to be sold is situated, and
publishing a copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive
weeks immediately preceding the sale, in some newspaper published in
the county, if there is one.
(2) P o s t p o n e m e n t . If at the time appointed for the sale of any real or
personal property on execution the officer shall deem it expedient and for
the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of
purchasers, or other sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from time
to time, until the same shall be completed; and in every such case he shall
make public declaration thereof at the time and place previously appointed for the sale, and if such postponement is for a longer time than
one day, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original
notice of such sale is required to be given.
(3) Conduct of sale. All sales of property under execution must be
made at auction to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m.
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and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the
execution no more shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution
norhis deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase
at such sale. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the sale, and it must
be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and when
the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels,
they must be sold separately; or when a portion of such real property is
claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold separately, such
portion must be thus sold. All sales of real property must be made at the
courthouse of the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is
situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the
order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such
property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can
be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such directions.
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for
the property struck off to him at a sale under execution, the officer may
again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is
occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition to being liable
on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person.
(5) Personal property. When the purchaser of any personal property
pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale shall deliver the
property to the purchaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery)
and shall execute and deliver to him a certificate of sale and payment.
Such certificate shall state that all right, title and interest which the
debtor had in and to such property on the day the execution or attachment was levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is transferred to the purchaser.
(6) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to
the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: (1) a particular description
of the real property sold; (2) the price paid by him lor each lot or parcel if
sold separately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to the effect that
all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to the
property is conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where such sale is
subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also. A duplicate of such
certificate shall be filed for record by the officer in the office of the recorder of the county. The real property sold shall be subject to redemption,
except where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which event said sale is absolute.
(f) Redemption from sale.
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to redemption, or any part
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their successors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a creditor having a lien by
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or part
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was sold.
(2) Redemption; how made. At the time of redemption the person
seeking the same may make payment of the amount required to the
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person from whom the property is being redeemed, or for him to the
officer who made the sale, or his successor in office. At the same time the
redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from whom he seeks to
redeem, and serve with his notice to the officer: (1) a certified copy of the
docket of the judgment under which he claims the right to redeem, or, if
he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record
thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly acknowledged or proved where the same is necessary to establish his claim; (3) an
affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount then actually due on
the lien.
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may be
redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying
the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in addition, together
with the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for
fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any improvements upon the property which the purchaser may have paid
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such amounts, and, if the
purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the person
seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which said purchase
was made, the amount of such lien, with interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded
for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption
may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was
issued, and at the same time file with the court a petition setting forth the
item or items demanded to which he objects, together with his grounds of
objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time for
hearing of such objections. A copy of the petition and order fixing time for
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than two days before the
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court shall enter an
order determining the amount required for redemption. In the event an
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the
person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper
certificate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the
court for redemption.
(4) S u b s e q u e n t redemptions. If the property is redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days
after the last redemption and within six months after the sale, redeem the
property from such last redemptioner in the same manner as provided in
the preceding subdivision, upon paying the sum of such last redemption,
with three percent thereon in addition and the amount of any assessment
or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the property which
the last redemptioner may have paid thereon, with interest on such
amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by such last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. Written notice of any redemption shall be given to the officer and a duplicate filed with the recorder of
the county. Similar notice shall be given of any taxes or assessments or
any sums for fire insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair
of any improvements upon the property, paid by the person redeeming, or
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the amount of any lien acquired, other than upon which the redemption
was made. Failure to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent redemptioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or other
liens.
(5) Where no redemption is made. If no redemption is made within
six months after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed and no
other redemption by a creditor has been made and notice thereof has been
given, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed
at the expiration of six months after the sale. If the judgment debtor
redeems, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a
redemption by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is
, terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon a redemption by the
debtor, the person to whom the payment is made must execute and deliver to him a certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certificate must be filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder where
the property is situated.
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the
time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of his
redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive from the tenant in possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the use and
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits have been received by
the judgment creditor or purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the property thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents and
profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the time allowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or creditor, or his assigns, a written and verified statement of the amounts of
such rents and profits thus received, the period for redemption is extended five days after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or
his assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or his assigns shall for a period of one month from and after such demand, fail or
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, within
sixty days after such demand, bring an action to compel an accounting
and disclosure of such rents and profits, and until fifteen days from and
after the final determination of such action the right of redemption is
extended to such redemptioner or debtor.
(g) Remedies of p u r c h a s e r .
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption,
the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property, upon
motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser, or his successor in interest. But it is not waste for the person in possession of the property at the
time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same manner in which it
was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to
make the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to use wood or timber
on the property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or for fuel for his
family while he occupies the property. After his estate has become absolute, the purchaser or his successor in interest may maintain an action to
recover damages for injury to the property by the tenant in possession
after sale and before possession is delivered under the conveyance.
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(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or is
dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property
sold was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on execution, or
his successor in interest, fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed
thereof or evicted therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall,
on motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment creditor as
the court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment creditor
for the price paid by the purchaser, together with interest. In the alternative, if such purchaser or his successor in interest, fails to recover possession of any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in
consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, or
because the property sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such
notice to the judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the
original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the amount paid by
such purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of payment at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and the judgment
so revived shall have the same force and effect as would an original
judgment of the date of the revival.
(h) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. When upon an
execution against several persons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of one, or one of them
pays, without a sale, more than his proportion, and the right of contribution
exists, he may compel such contribution from the others; and where a judgment against several is upon an obligation of one or more as security for the
others, and the surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by sale of
property or otherwise, he may require reimbursement from the principal. The
person entitled to contribution or reimbursement shall, within one month
after payment, or sale of his property in the event there is a sale, file in the
court where the judgment was rendered a notice of such payment and his
claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the filing of such notice the
clerk must make an entry thereof in the margin of the docket which shall
have the effect of a judgment against the other judgment debtors to the extent
of their liability for contribution or reimbursement.
(i) P a y m e n t of j u d g m e n t by person indebted to j u d g m e n t d e b t o r . After the issuance of an execution and before its return, any person indebted to
the judgment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of his debt, or so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the officer's receipt is
a sufficient discharge for the amount paid.
(j) Where property is claimed by third person. If an officer shall proceed
to levy any execution on any goods or chattels claimed by any person other
than the defendant, or should he be requested by the judgment creditor so to
do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an undertaking,
with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages that he may
sustain by reason of the detention or sale of such property; and until such
undertaking is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against such property.
(k) Order for a p p e a r a n c e of j u d g m e n t debtor; a r r e s t . At any time
when execution may issue on a judgment, the court from which an execution
might issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment creditor, with or
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without notice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring the judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to appear before the court
or a master at a specified time and place to answer concerning his or its
property. A judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, may be
required to attend outside the county in which he resides, but the court may
make such order as to mileage and expenses as is just. The order may also
restrain the judgment debtor from disposing of any nonexempt property pending the hearing. Upon the hearing such proceedings may be had for the application of the property of the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the
judgment as on execution against such property.
In aid of an order requiring the attendance of the judgment debtor, the court
may, upon satisfactory proof by affidavit or otherwise, that there is danger of
the debtor's absconding, order the sheriff to arrest the debtor and bring him
before the court, and may order such judgment debtor to enter into an undertaking with sufficient sureties, that he will attend from time to time before
the court or master, as may be directed during the pendency of the proceedings and until the final determination thereof, and will not in the meantime
dispose of any portion of his property not exempt from executic-n. In default of
entering into such undertaking, he may be committed to jail.
(1) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any time when execution may issue on a judgment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the
satisfaction of the court that any person or corporation has property of such
judgment debtor or is indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars,
not exempt from execution, the court may order such person or corporation or
any officer or agent thereof, to appear before the court or a master at a specified time and place to answer concerning the same. Witness fees and mileage,
if any, may be awarded by the court.
Cm) Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it appears that a person
or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from execution, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor or
denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or corporation to
refrain from transferring or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until
such time as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to bring
an action to determine such interest or claim and prosecute the same to judgment. Such order may be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon
such terms as may be just.
(n) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in any
proceedings brought under Subdivisions (k) and (1) of this rule in the same
manner as upon the trial of an issue.
(o) Order for p r o p e r t y to be applied on j u d g m e n t . The court or master
may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in
the hands of such debtor, or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor,
to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment.
(p) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a receiver of the
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid
any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until its
further order therein; provided that before any receiver shall be vested with
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of his appointment
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which any real
estate sought to be affected thereby is situated.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******
DON W. INGRAM and DICK L.
INGRAM, et al.,

Case Number CV 86 1100

Plaintiff.
vs.

RULING

O.B. SHEEP COMPANY, a
partnersheep, SNELL OLSEN,
SCOTT H. OLSEN, et al.,

GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE

Defendant,
********
Pursuant to a hearing held the 28th day of October,
1988 and oral argument there presented together with affidavits
and memorandum of law, the Court makes the following findings:
1.

That the sale of the subject property was called by

Deputy Sherrif, Arthur L. Adcock, on the 3rd day of August, 1988,
and that he then conducted the sale of the real estate described
in the order of sale.
2.

That Snell Olsen was personally known to said

deputy sheriff and was present at the sheriff's sale held on the
aforesaid date.
3.

That the sale was conducted in the standard

procedure for the Utah County Sheriff's Office with regard to
sales involving mutiple parcels of real property and that the

B-l

parties in attendance were asked at the sale if any of the
parties desired to have multiple parcels sold separately. That no
request was made by anyone including Snell Olsen, and that the
property was sold as one unit.
Pursuant to the aforesaid finding the Court concludes
that at the Sherrif's Sale on August 3, 1988 defendant, O.B.
Sheep Company and/or any of its partners including Snell Olsen
failed to make a request that the property be sold as separate
parcels and they therefore waived any such right O.B. Sheep
Company and its partners would have had at that time to have the
property sold as separate parcels, and the sale as conducted by
Deputy Sheriff Adcock was done in a lawful and proper manner.
Therefore the plaintiff's motion to enter the
deficiency judgment resulting from the aforesaid sale is granted
and the defendant's objection thereto is disallowed.
f

ft7

Dated at Provo, Utah this /<f day of January, 1989.
BY THE COURT

GEORGE <E
cc:

Michael N. Zundel
Leslie W. Slaugh
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J a m e s M. Dunn
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(#934)

Michael N. Zundel (#^755)
Laurie S. Hart (#4844)
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DON W. INGRAM and DICK L.
INGRAM, et al. ,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF UTAH
COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF
ARTHUR L. ADCOCK

O.B. SHEEP COMPANY, a
partnership, SNELL OLSEN,
SCOTT H. OLSEN, et al.,
Defendants,

Civi J No. CV 86-1100
(Judge BalJ if)

STATE OF UTAH
) ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH
Arthur L. Adcock, after being first duly sworn by mo,
declares that:
1.

I am currently employed as a Deputy Sher iff for

Utah County, State of Utah, and have pergonal knowledge of Uv*
facts set forth hereafter .

C-l
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2.
County,

In

I have

my

capacity

as

responsibility

a

Deputy

Sheriff

for conducting

for

Sheriff's

Utah
sales

for real property located in Utah County.
3.

On August 3, 1988, pursuant to Court Ordor in the

case of Don W. Ingram and Dick L. Ingram z _et _ajL v. O.B._^hcep
Company,

a partnership, Snell Olsen, Sc_otJt H. 01 sen, et al . ,

Civil No. CV86-1100, I conducted
to the real estate described

a Sheriff's sale with regard

in said Order of Sale, and more

particularly described on attached Exhibit A»
4.

Snell Olsen, who is personally

present at said Sheriff's sale held on August
5.
County

The

standard

Sheriff's

involving

Office

multiple

operating
with

parcels

of

3, 1988.

procedure

regard
real

known to me, was

to

Cor

the

Sheriff's

property

is

to

Utah
sales

ask

the

parties in attendance at the sale if any of the parties desire
to have the multiple parcels sold separately.
in

attendance

at

the

sale

specifically

Unless a party

requests

that

the

multiple parcels be sold separately, the standard procedure is
to sell the real property involved as a single parcel.
6.

In

conducting

the

Sheriff's

sale

on

August

3,

1988, I followed the standard operating procedure set forth in
paragraph 5 above.
7.

None

of

the

parties

in

attendance

at

the

Sheriff's sale held on August 3, 1988, including Snell Olsen,
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requested that the parcels involved be sold separately, nor did
any party present at the sale object to the fact that the real
property involved was sold as a single unit.
DATED this

%6

day of October, J 988.

x

ARTHUR f,. ADCOCK
Utah County Deputy Sheriff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 28 th ctoy of
October, 1988, by ARTHUR T.. ADCOCK.

&x&te&p-a^--

LSH-p335
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EXHIBIT "A"

UTAH COUNTY
Parcel No. 7; All of Section l r Township 11
Southf Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
Parcel No. 8: Lots l r 2, 3 and 4 r the South
half of the North half, and the South half
of Section 3, Township 11 South, Range 8
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel No. 9: All of Section 4, Township 11
South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian. Excepting therefrom the Southeast
quarter of the Southeast quarter of said
section.
Parcel No. 10: Lots 1 and 2, the South half
oT the Northeast quarter
lying East of
Highway, and the Southeast quarter lying
East of Highway of Section 5, Township 11
South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
Parcel
No. 11; The West
half
and
the
Southeast quarter, the Southwest quarter of
the Northeast quarter, and that portion of
the
Northeast
quarter
of
the
Northeast
quarter lying East of Highway of Section 5,
Township 11 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
Parcel
No. 12: The* North
half
of
the
Southeast quarter of the Southeast quarter
of Section 9, Township 11 South, Range 8
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. Excepting
therefrom
that portion of
the Southwest
quarter of the Northwest quarter lying West
of the Highway.
Parcel No. 13: The West half, the Northeast
quarter, and the South half of the Southeast
quarter of Section 10, Township 11 South,
Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
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